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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals1 has
had wide-ranging impact. Codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, federal
courts are now required to act as “gatekeepers” to ensure that expert evidence is
both relevant and reliable. Courts have applied the principles articulated in the
Daubert decision in an ever-expanding range of cases, including not only
product liability and mass tort cases where the doctrine was originally
developed,2 but also antitrust, securities, commercial, and environmental
contamination cases.3 Indeed, any case in which scientific or technical expert
evidence is presented is a candidate for a challenge under Daubert to the
reliability and relevance of a party’s expert evidence.
Decisions regarding the admissibility of expert evidence under Rule 702 and
Daubert are frequently dispositive. Wherever expert testimony is submitted or
required to establish various elements of a plaintiff’s claim, review by the trial
court under Rule 702 and Daubert has the potential to bar plaintiff’s claims in
part or in their entirety. Even where Daubert motions are not completely
successful, they can have the effect of significantly shaping the issues for trial.
Accordingly, parties in large-scale litigation frequently expend great effort in
litigating the scientific and technical basis for their claims before the trial judge.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that parties in patent litigation are increasingly
challenging the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert.
These challenges initially focused on the plaintiff’s damages case, gaining
support with the Federal Circuit decisions in Lucent,4 ResQNet,5 Uniloc,6 and
LaserDynamics7 and building on the common-law principle that damages may
not be speculative. However, challenges to other types of expert testimony are
increasingly common. Thus, for example, litigants have challenged proffered
expert testimony on infringement, claim construction, and enablement. Given

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2012); Pluck v. BP Oil Pipeline Co.,
640 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2011); Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2007);
Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2003); Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d
269 (5th Cir. 1998); Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996); McClain v.
Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2005).
3 See, e.g., In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009) (securities);
Ky. Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 588 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2009)
(antitrust); Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (antitrust);
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999) (environmental contamination).
4 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
5 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
6 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
1
2
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that Daubert presents another opportunity for a litigant to derail or limit an
opponent’s claims, the frequency of such challenges, which can have significant
impact on the litigation, is only likely to increase. Indeed, recent decisions in
high-profile patent cases have only added to the likelihood that litigants will
seek to invoke Daubert in future cases.
Part II of this Article discusses the general principles articulated in Daubert
and subsequent decisions interpreting Rule 702. These decisions provide
significant guidance regarding general principles that may be applied in
assessing the relevance and reliability of proffered scientific evidence, including
in the patent context. The Supreme Court has made clear that the scrutiny of
expert evidence under Rule 702 and Daubert is rigorous, designed to ensure that
any expert testimony upon which a party seeks to rely is both relevant and
reliable, and that the expert is qualified to offer the opinions for which the
expert is being offered.
Part III then discusses application of Daubert in the context of patent
litigation, beginning first with its application to expert opinions regarding
damages and then its expansion into other areas of expert testimony. As in
other areas, many of the principles applied in analyzing Daubert issues in the
patent context are not unique. Courts seek to ensure that an expert’s testimony
is sufficiently reliable to be admissible and that the expert’s opinions are
sufficiently related to the issues in the case. Nonetheless, patent cases present a
whole new set of circumstances in which Daubert principles may be applied,
given the wide range of experts that frequently testify in such cases and the
unique role of the courts in deciding other threshold matters.
II. THE PRINCIPLES ARTICULATED IN DAUBERT
Under Rule 702 and Daubert, federal trial courts must serve as gatekeepers to
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.8 As the Supreme Court recognized in its subsequent
decision in Weisgram v. Marley, under Rule 702, expert testimony must meet
“exacting standards of reliability.”9 The burden is on the proponent of expert
testimony to show by a preponderance of proof that the expert meets each of
the Daubert requirements.10 The requirements apply not only to purely
“scientific” evidence, but to all expert testimony involving “technical” or “other

8 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[T]he trial judge must ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).
9 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
10 509 U.S. at 592 n.10.
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specialized” knowledge.11 In patent cases, the district court looks to the law of
the regional circuit in determining the admissibility of expert evidence under
Rule 702 and Daubert.12
Among other things, Rule 702 requires that expert witnesses (1) base their
opinions upon sufficient facts or data, (2) develop their opinions using reliable
principles and methods, and (3) apply those principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.13 In addition, expert witnesses must be qualified by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to offer their opinions.14
Expert opinions that fail to meet these requirements are inadmissible.15
The text of Rule 702 provides some guidance with respect to the nature of
the inquiry. The rule requires that an expert’s testimony be based on
“scientific . . . knowledge,”16 which courts have interpreted as implying that the
expert’s opinions have a “grounding in the methods and procedures of
science.”17 Expert testimony cannot be based on mere “subjective belief or
unsupported speculation.”18
Accordingly, under Rule 702’s reliability prong, proposed testimony must be
supported by “appropriate validation”—what the Supreme Court in Daubert
labeled “ ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.”19 An expert’s mere
assurance that the expert has utilized generally accepted principles is
insufficient.20 Rather, there must be some independent basis for concluding
that the expert’s opinions meet the requirements under Rule 702.
Not only must expert opinion be based on sufficient facts and data, but it
must be “the product of reliable principles and methods” that are reliably
applied to the facts of the case.21 “[T]he reliability analysis applies to all aspects
of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s
opinion, [and] the link between the facts and the conclusion.”22 In sum, an
11 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“We conclude that Daubert’s
general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only
to testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other
specialized’ knowledge.”). See also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (2000
amendments) (“An opinion from an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same degree
of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert who purports to be a scientist.”).
12 Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
13 FED. R. EVID. 702.
14 Id.
15 McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002).
16 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
17 Id. at 590.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Brown v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 705 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2013).
21 FED. R. EVID. 702.
22 Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999).
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expert must “employ[ ] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”23
Under Daubert’s relevance prong, expert evidence must assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The Supreme Court
has characterized this language as imposing, among other things, a requirement
of “fit” between the expert’s proposed testimony and the facts and
circumstances of the case.24 In other words, an expert’s opinion must be
“sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a
factual dispute.”25 As the Supreme Court explained in General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, expert testimony is inadmissible where “there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”26 “[N]othing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert.”27
Finally, the expert must be qualified to offer each of the expert’s opinions.28
In assessing this prong under Rule 702, courts seek to ensure that the expert has
specific qualifications that fit the specific opinions the expert is intending to
offer.29 “The issue with regard to expert testimony is not the qualifications of a
witness in the abstract, but whether those qualifications provide a foundation
for a witness to answer a specific question.”30
In applying these requirements, courts thoroughly scrutinize proffered
expert testimony to ensure that the Daubert requirements are met at “every step”
of an expert’s analysis.31 “[A]ny step that renders the analysis unreliable under
the Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.”32 “The analysis
outlined in Daubert is extensive, requiring the district court to carefully and
meticulously review the proffered scientific evidence.”33
Novel and unsupported theories are inadmissible under Daubert. While such
theories may be sufficient to generate hypotheses in the scientific arena, they
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
25 Id.
26 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
27 Id. at 137.
28 FED. R. EVID. 702 (witness must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education”).
29 See, e.g., Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994); Ralston v. Smith &
Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969-70 (10th Cir. 2001); Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 715 (8th Cir. 2001).
30 Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994).
31 Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002).
32 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
33 Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 356 F.3d 1326, 1335 (10th Cir. 2004), quoting United States v. Call, 129
F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997).
23
24
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provide an inadequate foundation for the admissibility of an expert’s opinions
in a court of law.34 “[W]hat science treats as a useful but untested hypothesis
the law should generally treat as inadmissible speculation.”35
III. THE EXPANDING APPLICATION OF DAUBERT IN PATENT CASES
Litigants are increasingly asking federal courts to apply these principles in
patent cases. While parties initially raised Daubert and Rule 702 in the context
of damages as a natural extension of case law holding that damages could not
be speculative, as litigants had success in mounting such challenges, their use
has expanded. As one magistrate judge recently observed, “Daubert motions
used to be relatively rare in patent cases, and Daubert challenges to damages
experts rarer still, [b]ut with a few high profile successes, now every patent trial
lawyer worth her salt brings a challenge to the damages opinions offered by her
adversary.”36
In recent years, the application of Daubert has expanded beyond the subject
of damages to other kinds of expert testimony in patent cases. Expert opinions
relating to infringement or patent validity, for example, have increasingly been
the subject of Daubert challenges. This is not particularly surprising given the
general expansion of Daubert in many areas of the law as well as the wide range
of different kinds of expert testimony that may arise in the context of patent
litigation. As the Federal Circuit has remarked in the context of expert
testimony at the Markman stage,
extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful
to a court for a variety of purposes, such as to provide
background on the technology at issue, to explain how an
invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the
technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person
of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the
patent or the prior art as a particular meaning in the pertinent
field.37

Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Law lags science; it does not
lead it.”); Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he law cannot
wait for future scientific investigation and research. We must resolve cases in our courts on the
basis of scientific knowledge that is currently available.”).
35 Tamraz v, Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 677 (6th Cir. 2010).
36 Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 2013 WL 4538210, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2013).
37 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
34
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Accordingly, with the rise in the use of expert evidence, challenges under Rule
702 and Daubert are becoming increasingly common in patent litigation.
A. DAMAGES

The principles governing the analysis of expert evidence with respect to
patent damages are relatively well-established. They add to a framework for
assessing damages that pre-dates Daubert and Rule 702 in which courts have laid
out the appropriate measures and means of calculating damages in patent cases.
Under this framework, where infringement is proven, a patentee is entitled to
“damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”38
Two alternative categories of compensation for patent infringement are the
patentee’s lost profits and the reasonable royalty the patentee would have
received through arms-length bargaining.39 A reasonable royalty is “ ‘the floor
below which damages shall not fall,’ ”40 and is typically based on a hypothetical
negotiation between the patentee and the infringer at the time the infringement
began.41 “The hypothetical negotiation tries, as best as possible, to recreate the
ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the resulting agreement.”42
The court’s decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.
provides a frequently cited list of factors that may be considered in determining
a reasonable royalty and which have been extended in subsequent decisions.43
Experts often use these factors as a basis for ascertaining a reasonable royalty to
compensate for patent infringement. Accordingly, it is not surprising that one
35 U.S.C. § 284.
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978)).
40 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)).
41 Unisplay, S.A. v. American Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
42 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325.
43 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
These factors include: (1) established royalty rate for the patent; (2) license rates paid for
comparable patents; (3) type of license (exclusive/non-exclusive or restricted/non-restricted; (4)
licensor’s established licensing policies; (5) competitive relationship between licensor and licensee;
(6) convoyed sales; (7) duration and terms of the license; (8) commercial success and established
profitability; (9) advantages over old methods; (10) nature of patented invention and benefits to
those that use it; (11) extent of use of the patent by the infringer; (12) customary industry rate for
invention or analogous inventions; (13) portion of profit that should be credited to the invention
as distinguished from non-patented elements, manufacturing process, business risks, or significant
features added by the infringer; (14) opinion testimony of qualified experts; and (15) amount that
licensor and licensee would have agreed upon. Id. The Federal Circuit “sanction[ed] the use of
the Georgia Pacific factors to frame the reasonable royalty” in its decision in Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
38
39
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of the first areas in which courts began applying Daubert and Rule 702 in patent
cases was in the context of ascertaining the admissibility of expert damages
testimony.
As a result, today there is a relatively robust body of case law applying Rule
702 and Daubert in the context of patent damages. In the last decade, the
Federal Circuit has issued a string of decisions that have provided significant
guidance with respect to both the relevance and reliability prong under Rule
702. These decisions have focused on ensuring that damages calculations “fit”
the facts of the case by accurately placing a value on the harm caused by the
alleged infringement while simultaneously ensuring that damages opinions are
based on evidence that is “reliable and tangible . . . not conjecture or
speculative.”44
1. The Federal Circuit’s Damages Framework. While not a decision addressing
Rule 702 or Daubert because such challenges were not raised at the district
court, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. is
one of the seminal decisions addressing patent damages that is frequently cited
in subsequent decisions under Daubert and Rule 702. In Lucent, the Federal
Circuit held that a damages award for infringement of a patent for a method of
entering information into fields on a computer screen without using a keyboard
was not supported by substantial evidence.45 The court found that some of the
license agreements upon which the plaintiff’s damages expert based the
reasonable royalty calculation were “radically different from the hypothetical
agreement under consideration.”46 The court held that “a lump-sum damages
award cannot stand solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a
recitation of royalty numbers, one of which is arguably in the ballpark of the
jury’s award, particularly when it is doubtful that the technology of those license
agreements is in any way similar to the technology being litigated . . . .”47
Although the jury’s verdict was based on a lump sum and not a running
royalty, the Federal Circuit held that to the extent the jury implicitly based its
award on an application of the entire market value rule, the award was not
supported by substantial evidence.48 The court noted that the defendant’s
product (Microsoft’s Outlook) was “an enormously complex software program
comprising hundreds, if not thousands or even more, features,” and rejected the
suggestion that “the use of one small feature, the date-picker, constitutes a

Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318.
580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
46 Id. at 1327–28.
47 Id. at 1329.
48 Id. at 1324–25 (noting that jury awarded a lump sum and indicated no amount on the verdict
form’s line for a running royalty).
44
45
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substantial portion of the value of Outlook.”49 The program consisted of
millions of lines of code, “only a tiny fraction of which encodes the date-picker
feature.”50 The court observed that “numerous features other than the datepicker appear to account for the overwhelming majority of the consumer
demand and therefore significant profit.”51 Thus, assuming the jury did apply
the entire market value rule to award the lump-sum royalty, the court held such
an application would amount to legal error.52
In ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the Federal Circuit likewise vacated a
damages award for infringement of patents relating to screen recognition
software used to facilitate terminal emulation. The court noted that “a
reasonable royalty analysis requires a court to hypothesize, not to speculate.”53
“At all times, the damages inquiry must concentrate on compensation for the
economic harm caused by infringement of the claimed invention.”54 Following
its prior decision in Lucent, the court found that the license agreements that
served as the basis for plaintiff’s reasonable royalty analysis were not sufficiently
comparable to the technology at issue to serve as a reliable basis for a damages
analysis. Rather, the court found that the expert “used licenses with no
relationship to the claimed invention to drive the royalty rate up to unjustified
double-digit levels.”55 The license agreements did not mention the patents in
suit or show “any other discernible link to the claimed technology.”56 As the
court noted, it had “long required district courts performing reasonable royalty
calculations to exercise vigilance when considering past licenses to technologies
other than the patent in suit.”57
In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the court rejected “a matter of Federal
Circuit law” the 25% rule of thumb, a longstanding standard for calculating a
reasonable royalty.58 Building on its prior decisions, the court concluded that,
despite the rule’s longstanding pedigree, it was “a fundamentally flawed tool for
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation” and thus was
“inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails
Id. at 1332.
Id.
51 Id. at 1333.
52 Id. at 1337.
53 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 870.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 869. See also Wordtech Sys. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308,
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[C]omparisons of past patent licenses to the infringement must account
for ‘the technological and economic differences’ between them.” (quoting ResQnet.com, 594 F.3d
at 873)).
58 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
49
50
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to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”59 The court
observed that “[t]he bottom line of Kumho Tire and [General Electric Co. v.] Joiner
is that one major determinant of whether an expert should be excluded under
Daubert is whether he has justified the application of a general theory to the
facts of the case.”60 The court thereby extended the framework the court had
developed for analyzing expert damages testimony by invoking the principles
under Rule 702 and Daubert.
As the court observed, its prior decisions made clear that “there must be a
basis in fact to associate the royalty rates used in prior licenses to the particular
hypothetical negotiation at issue in the case.”61 However, the court found that
the 25% rule of thumb “as an abstract and largely theoretical construct fails to
satisfy this fundamental requirement.”62 This was because “[t]he rule does not
say anything about a particular hypothetical negotiation or reasonable royalty
involving any particular technology, industry or party.”63 Accordingly, the court
determined that the 25% rule of thumb was an even more unreliable and
irrelevant basis for the royalty rate than the unrelated licenses at issue in
ResQNet and Lucent.
In LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., the Federal Circuit expanded
upon this line of cases by holding that a damages expert must apportion down
to the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit” in a case involving patents
relating to optical disc drives. The court reasoned that, “[w]here small elements
of multi-component products are accused of infringement, calculating a royalty
on the entire product carries a considerable risk that the patentee will be
improperly compensated for non-infringing components of that product.”64
Thus, the court held, “it is generally required that royalties be based not on the
entire product, but instead on the ‘smallest salable patent-practicing unit.’ ”65
As the court observed, it was common for products, particularly electronic
devices, to include numerous distinct components, many of which may be
separately patented.66 Accordingly, it was particularly important in such cases to
ensure that an expert’s damages analysis fit the precise facts of the case and not
over-compensate plaintiffs for technology that was not related to the patents at
issue.

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id. at 1316 (quoting ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869).
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. (quoting Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)).
Id. at 66.
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This conclusion flowed not only from the principle that damages should fit
the precise injury alleged, but also from the requirement that damages be
reliable and not speculative. As the court observed, the Federal Circuit had
previously noted that “ ‘a reasonable royalty analysis requires a court to
hypothesize, not to speculate . . . [T]he trial court must carefully tie proof of
damages to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market place.’ ”67 “A
damages theory must be based on ‘sound economic and factual predicates.’ ”68
The court concluded that the expert’s opinion failed to satisfy these
requirements. The expert had not conducted any market studies or consumer
surveys to ascertain whether the demand for laptop computers was driven by
the patented optical disc drive technology. Rather, the court concluded that
“the patented method is best understood as a useful commodity-type feature
that consumers expect will be present in all laptop computers.”69 The expert
did not present any evidence that this patented feature alone motivated
consumers to purchase a laptop computer. Moreover, the court concluded that
the one-third apportionment factor the expert applied to reduce the royalty
“appears to have been plucked out of thin air based on vague qualitative
notions of the relative importance of the ODD technology.”70 The court
agreed with the district court that the expert supplied “no credible economic
analysis” to support the apportionment factor, and thus the expert’s opinion
was akin to the 25% rule of thumb that the court invalidated in Uniloc.71
Finally, in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., the
Federal Circuit similarly held that admission of an expert’s damages opinions
was an abuse of discretion where the expert based the opinions on unreliable
assumptions and data. The court determined that the expert’s opinions were
“unreliable in several respects.”72 As a threshold matter, the court concluded
that the source of the information upon which the expert relied for his
estimates of Samsung’s worldwide sales was “unclear,” given that the expert
Id. at 67 (quoting ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869).
Id. (quoting Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). See
also DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that, under the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Grain Processing, “th[e] court requires sound economic proof of the
nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement out of the picture” and that “the
concept of sound economic proof requires some grounding in ‘sound economic and factual
predicates’”).
69 LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 69.
70 Id.
71 Id. See also Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318 (a patentee “must in every case give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented
feature and the unpatented features,” and that evidence must be “reliable and tangible . . . not
conjecture or speculative”).
72 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
67
68
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could not explain where the information came from and “assumed” that the
material was taken from the Internet.73 In addition, the court concluded that
the expert “made two speculative leaps.”74 The expert relied upon data
regarding shipments of Samsung phones, assuming that each Samsung mobile
phone included a charger and that each of these chargers incorporated an
infringing power circuit. However, the documents upon which the expert relied
did not “provide any reliable link which might indicate that the shipped phones
included chargers” and thus the expert could not “safely assume that all of these
shipments must have included a charger.”75 Moreover, the court noted that the
“sales document lists no model numbers or other indicia from which [the
expert] could reasonably infer that chargers assumed to be included
incorporated . . . infringing power circuits.” As the court observed, several
other companies sold competing power circuits to Samsung and thus “at least
some of Samsung’s chargers could have incorporated the competing power
circuits or Power Integrations’ own circuits, which do not infringe.”76 Plaintiff’s
expert provided no basis to distinguish between infringing and noninfringing
chargers, and the court concluded that “his assumption that all chargers
incorporated an infringing power circuit was speculation.”77 Thus, the court
held that the expert’s opinion was “derived from unreliable data and built on
speculation,” “[was] too far removed from the facts of th[e] case,” and “lack[ed]
the hallmarks of genuinely useful expert testimony.”78
2. The District Courts. The district courts have applied these principles in
excluding expert damages testimony that does not meet the requirements of
Rule 702 and Daubert in a variety of diverse contexts, including in several recent
high-profile decisions. While many of these cases involve straightforward
application of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in cases such as Lucent, ResqNet.com
and LaserDynamics, others involve broader issues, with courts looking to general
Daubert principles to asses both the relevance and reliability of expert damages
testimony.
a. Apportionment of Damages. Following Federal Circuit precedent,
apportionment of damages is a frequent basis for motions to exclude expert
damages opinions in the district courts. In Rembrandt Social Media, LP v.
Facebook, Inc., for example, the district court excluded the opinion of plaintiff’s
damages expert in a case alleging that Facebook infringed a patent describing a

73
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1373–74.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
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method for implementing a web page diary.79 The court concluded that
plaintiff’s expert failed to properly apportion the defendant’s revenue due to
features that were alleged to infringe plaintiff’s patent. As a result, the expert
claimed damages “ ‘far in excess of the contribution of the claimed invention to
the market’ and thus claimed ‘more than the ‘damages adequate to compensate
for the infringement.’ ”80
The court observed that it was not always sufficient to apportion down to
the smallest salable unit and that further apportionment may be required: “The
smallest salable unit must be closely tied to the patent to suffice, and further
apportionment is required even when ‘the accused product is the smallest
salable unit’ . . . if the ‘smallest salable unit is still a multi-component product
encompassing non-patent related features.’ ”81 By way of example, the court
cited the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lucent that sales of the Outlook program
could not serve as a basis for the royalty base where plaintiff alleged that only
one feature of the program infringed. This was true even though the multicomponent Outlook program was the smallest salable unit in the case. Thus,
the court concluded that the expert’s use of the entire value of certain features
that could be used independently without infringing as the royalty base was “a
mistake of the same kind as allowing [plaintiff’s] expert to use the entire value
of Facebook.”82
The court concluded that the expert’s analysis of customer surveys to
calculate the royalty rate was unreliable for similar reasons. The expert assumed
without explanation that the weighted importance of any given feature of
Facebook was equal to the same percentage of advertising revenue. The expert
failed to perform an analysis to explain why the weighted importance of some
feature to a user directly correlated with a certain percentage of Facebook’s
advertising revenue. The court therefore found the expert’s methodology
“suspect” and “unreliable under Rule 702.”83
Finally, in Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., the court excluded the
opinions of plaintiff’s damages expert on multiple grounds, including the failure
of the expert to properly apportion damages.84 The court observed that
apportionment was required to determine the smallest salable infringing unit
with close relation to the claimed invention. However, plaintiff’s expert based
Rembrandt Social Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2013).
Id. at 594 (quoting Cornell Univ., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283–84).
81 Id. (quoting Synetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 2013 WL 4538210 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2013)).
82 Id. at 595.
83 Id. at 596.
84 Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., No. C 11-05973PSG, 2013 WL 4538210, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013).
79
80
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the damages calculation on an “optional feature” of the allegedly infringing
product, which had the patented feature at issue as only “one component.”85 In
addition, the court concluded that the expert “impermissibly assumed based on
no facts in this particular case that the starting point for a hypothetical
negotiation” over a reasonable royalty rate “would be 50% of the gross profit
margin.”86 The expert purported to base the 50% figure on “his own
experience and judgment,” but the court concluded that this was an arbitrary
figure that was akin to the 25% starting figure the Federal Circuit rejected as
unreliable in Uniloc.87
b. Relevance of Underlying Data. Courts have similarly ruled that reliance on
data that is too far removed from the facts of the case renders an expert’s
damages opinion inadmissible in a variety of different contexts. In TV
Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., for example, the court excluded the opinions
of a damages expert who based his conclusion regarding a reasonable royalty
rate on certain rates in patent pools. The court concluded that the expert
“failed to show any degree of comparability” between these patent pools and
the patent at issue in the suit and thus was not allowed to “refer to the royalty
rates for the patent pools.”88
In DataQuill Ltd. v. High Tech Computer Corp., the court struck a portion of the
plaintiff expert’s reasonable royalty analysis where the expert relied on license
agreements for large patent portfolios executed by large companies, even
though only two patents were at issue in the litigation and the patentee was a
small company. The court determined that the expert had not shown that the
agreements upon which the expert relied were “economically comparable,”
even though the court conceded that the expert had provided evidence that the
licenses were “technologically comparable.”89 The court observed that “[t]he
testimony of a damages expert in a patent suit who relies on non-comparable
licenses in reaching his royalty rate should be excluded.”90
In Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the court excluded in part the
opinions of plaintiff’s damages expert who relied on certain treble rate
provisions in various licenses to argue that the royalty rate should be tripled.91
The court observed that the provisions upon which the expert relied were

Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
87 Id. at *4.
88 TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
89 Data Quill Ltd. v. High Tech. Computer Corp., 887 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1022, 1024 (S.D. Cal.
2011).
90 Id. at 1022.
91 Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 2417367 (E.D.
Tex. June 14, 2011).
85
86
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penalty provisions that were designed to discourage the licensee from
challenging or participating in a challenge to the validity of the patents.92 The
court concluded that, “[a]s penalty clauses, they would not be relevant for the
purpose that [plaintiff’s expert] intends to use them — that is — to show that
by removing the ‘uncertainty’ of invalidity, the royalty rate would be tripled.”93
Finally, in Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., the court barred
plaintiff’s damages expert from testifying regarding the defendant corporation’s
total revenues. The court concluded that the defendant’s “overall revenues are
irrelevant” to the issue of damages and therefore inadmissible under Rule 702.94
In addition, the court found that such testimony would be inadmissible under
Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial.95
c. Reliability of Underlying Data and Analysis. The reliability of the data can
also be grounds for exclusion. In IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., for
example, the court observed that “[a] reliable reasonable royalty calculation
depends on trustworthy evidence of both the royalty base and the royalty
rate.”96 The court concluded that the expert’s damages calculation relating to a
desktop switching feature failed to meet this standard given that the expert had
no reliable basis for the expert’s reasonable royalty calculation.97 The court
observed that “selected users’ statements in isolation and without a relationship
to the actual claimed technology do not show an accurate economic
measurement of total market demand for the switching feature, let alone its
contribution to the demand for the entire product asserted as the royalty
base.”98 The court found that “[t]he workspace switching feature’s small role in
the overall product is further confirmed when one considers the relative
importance of certain other features such as security, interoperability, and
virtualization.”99 The court noted that the record was contrary to the expert’s
assumptions given that “users do not buy the accused operating systems for
their workspace switching feature.”100
In addition, the court observed that the damages expert “arbitrarily picked a
royalty rate that is much higher than the existing royalty rates for licenses to the
patents-in-suit.”101 The expert had used a royalty rate for the “software
Id.
Id. at *6.
94 Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., No. 08-874-RGA, 2014 WL 554853, at *3
(D. Del. Feb. 6, 2014).
95 Id.
96 IP Innovation LLC v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
97 Id. at 691.
98 Id. at 690.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 690–91.
92
93
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industry,” which the court indicated encompassed much more than the desktop
switching feature that was at issue in the case.102 The expert offered “no
evidence that the alleged industry agreements are in any way comparable to the
patents-in-suit.”103 At the same time, the expert disregarded prior license
agreements that involved one or more of the patents-in-suit. The court
observed that “these licenses are far more relevant than the general market
studies on which [the expert] primarily relied in his expert report.”104
Accordingly, the expert not only relied on data that was not particularly relevant
or reliable but failed to consider data that the court found was directly relevant
to the reasonable royalty calculation.
In Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, the court similarly excluded an expert’s
damages analysis because, among other things, the expert’s analysis was not
reliable.105 The court found that one basis for exclusion was the fact that the
patentee’s expert had conducted “no independent analysis”; rather, he “relie[d],
without verification, on Plaintiff’s employees and Plaintiff’s counsel for
information crucial to his opinions.”106 The court concluded that this violated
Rule 702 because “an expert’s testimony must be based on independent analysis
and objective proof.”107
In ABT Systems, LLC v. Emerson Electric Co., the court excluded in part the
opinions of plaintiff’s damages expert on the ground that they lacked a reliable
basis.108 The expert based his opinion regarding a reasonable royalty rate in part
on a trade brochure and the face of the touchscreen of the accused products,
which he concluded suggested that the patented feature (a “CCF feature”)
“could be the most important feature” of the product, which had a “significant
upward impact on the royalty rate derived for the patents-in-suit.”109 The court
concluded that this opinion was “neither warranted by the facts relied upon by
[the expert], nor the result of reliable principles and methods.”110 Accordingly,
the court determined that it violated the principle that “ ‘[a] damages theory
must be based on ‘sound economic and factual predicates.’ ”111

Id. at 691.
Id.
104 Id.
105 Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, No. 1:11-cv-283, 2013 WL 4482442, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
20, 2013).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 ABT Sys., LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 4:11CV0374 AGF, 2013 WL 490174 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 8, 2013).
109 Id. at *2.
110 Id.
111 Id. (quoting Riles, 298 F.3d at 1311).
102
103
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In AVM Technologies, LLC v. Intel Corp., the court excluded the opinion of
plaintiff’s damages expert regarding a reasonable royalty based on a single
licensing agreement that resulted from a settlement of prior litigation.112 The
court noted that plaintiff’s expert failed to explain why the agreement alone
could be the basis “for an accurate conclusion about the hypothetical
negotiation over the ‘547 patent.”113 The litigation settlement related to a
different patent and was executed five years after the hypothetical negotiation
would have taken place. The court found that reliance on this lone agreement
was “completely speculative without, at a minimum, some analysis of the
litigation that led to the settlement.”114 “Without analysis of the litigation, the
conclusion cannot be based on ‘sound economic and factual predicates.’ ”115
Moreover, the court concluded that “[w]hereas multiple settlement agreements
might show a pattern, a single settlement agreement on a different patent
without any analysis of the settlement context is not a reliable method for
calculating damages.”116 And it noted that “[a]n analysis that relies on a single
license agreement but does not take into account why other licenses are not
comparable cannot be a reliable analysis.”117
d. Lack of Evidentiary Support. Where an expert fails to support key
aspects of the expert’s damages opinion or makes unsupported assumptions,
the damages opinions may likewise be subject to exclusion. In Rolls-Royce PLC
v. United Technologies Corp., for example, the court limited the opinions of
plaintiff’s damages expert in a case involving alleged infringement of a patent
relating to the design of jet engine fan blades. The court concluded that the
expert’s opinion regarding price erosion damages was unsupported. While the
expert asserted that jet engines were a “necessity” and thus the plaintiff would
have been able to charge twice as much for its engines absent infringement, the
expert did not “cite any evidence for the proposition that a jet engine is a
necessity in the same way as is milk.”118 Likewise, the court concluded that
there was “insufficient evidence” to support the expert’s use of the entire
market value of the engines in calculating lost profits. The court found that the
expert’s opinion regarding “price erosion and lost profits damage is based on
misstatements of the law, a lack of sound evidence, and unsupported

AVM Tech., LLC v. Intel Corp., 927 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Del. 2013).
Id. at 143.
114 Id.
115 Id. (quoting Riles, 298 F.3d at 1311).
116 Id. at 144.
117 Id.
118 Rolls-Royce PLC v. United Tech. Corp., No. 1:10CV457, 2011 WL 1740143, at *4 (E.D. Va.
May 4, 2011).
112
113
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assumptions” and that his paid up royalty theory was similarly flawed.119
Finally, the court noted that the expert’s report “reads more like a lawyer’s brief
advocating for the highest conceivable damage award rather than an expert
trying to assist the trier of fact reach a reasonable damages figure.” “Because of
this extensive overreaching, the entire report is undermined.”120
In Bowling v. Hasbro, Inc., the court similarly excluded an expert’s opinions on
the ground that they were not sufficiently supported. The court noted that the
expert’s report and testimony “reveal[ed] that no rigorous analysis was
performed,” but “rather the witness engaged in a superficial and result oriented
application of the Georgia-Pacific methodology.”121 Indeed, the court concluded
that the analysis “lacks sufficient reference to facts, data, or any relevant
information at all.”122 The court concluded that the expert’s assumption that
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant would have been one of
supplier and customer was particularly unsupported and was used to artificially
inflate the royalty rate. As the court noted, “an expert opinion is not admissible
when it is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of an expert.”123 In
particular the expert admitted that he had “no particular starting point” for his
analysis of the appropriate royalty rate and was relying solely upon his own
experience.124
In addition, the court concluded that there was no attempt to “connect the
Georgia-Pacific factors” to the expert’s “ultimate conclusion as to the reasonable
royalty rate.”125 Rather, the court concluded that the expert conducted only a
superficial analysis of the Georgia-Pacific factors “in order to reason backwards to
his pre-ordained conclusion.”126 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was
“apparent” that the expert “drafted a report specifically intended to superficially
justify a royalty rate that would maximize damages” and that the expert’s
opinions “lack a dependable foundation, are not reliable, and for this reason
must be excluded.”127
Finally, in Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., the court
excluded an expert’s damages opinions on the ground that certain elements had
no “factual predicate.”128 Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff
Id. at *9.
Id.
121 Bowling v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 05-2295, 2008 WL 717741, at *4 (D.R.I. Mar. 17, 2008).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at *6.
126 Id.
127 Id. at *7.
128 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp. Ltd., No. 09-290, 2012 WL 5409800, at *3
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2012).
119
120
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university’s contention that the infringement had adversely affected its ability to
attract top faculty or students, resulted in unspecified “lost opportunities,” and
diminished its capacity to fulfill its mission were unsupported. The court noted
that “[w]ithout any factual support, these supposed ‘harms’ are speculative, not
relevant, and, if presented at trial, would complicate the issues and confuse the
jury.”129 The court similarly excluded evidence of alleged damage to the
university’s reputation and standing in the university community, holding that
“such evidence is not relevant to the hypothetical negotiation, and, if presented
at trial, will only tend to confuse the issues and mislead the jury.”130
e. Intersection with Patent Law. The admissibility of expert evidence under
Rule 702 and Daubert may be inextricably interlinked with the court’s decisions
regarding substantive patent issues. In one recent decision that received
significant publicity, for example, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, sitting
by designation as a district court judge in the Northern District of Illinois,
issued an opinion holding inadmissible proposed testimony by three of the
parties’ damages experts in a case involving patents relating to smartphones,
effectively ending the litigation in a decision that the Federal Circuit
subsequently reversed on appeal based largely on the court’s determination that
errors in claim construction infected the district court’s decisions regarding
admissibility of expert damages testimony.131
While the Federal Circuit reversed Judge Posner’s decision on the
admissibility of the expert evidence, the court focused heavily on substantive
patent law issues. First, the court concluded that the ruling was based “on an
incorrect claim construction” which, “alone, would require reversal and
remand” because it “tainted the district court’s damages analysis.”132 Thus, the
court observed that, by engaging in what the Federal Circuit considered to be
an “overly narrow” construction of the claims, the district court improperly
concluded that the expert’s damages analysis “was too far removed from the
asserted claims.”133 The other error the Federal Circuit found in the district
court’s analysis was that it allegedly failed to consider “the full scope of
infringement,” and as a result “incorrectly focused on individual claim
limitations in isolation” in evaluating the reliability of the expert opinions.134
The Federal Circuit’s decision illustrates the complex ways in which
evidentiary issues under Rule 702 and Daubert may intersect with substantive
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
131 See Apple, Inc. v Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-w-6840, 2012 WL 1959560 (N.D. Ill. May 22,
2012).
132 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
133 Id. at 1317.
134 Id.
129
130
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issues in patent cases. In many ways, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple is
more about substantive issues regarding claim construction and infringement
than it is about Rule 702. Accordingly, Daubert analyses in the context of patent
cases may prove more complex in some situations than in other kinds of cases.
f. Expert Qualifications. Finally, limitations in an expert’s qualifications
have also been a basis for exclusion. While the Federal Circuit has only rarely
addressed expert qualifications as a basis for exclusion, it has upheld at least one
district court ruling on this ground. In State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v.
Condotte America, Inc., the court affirmed the exclusion of a damages expert who
acknowledged that he had “no experience in placing a value on a patent and did
not have any knowledge regarding reasonable royalties for construction-related
patents.”135 However, such challenges have arisen more frequently in the
district courts, typically as part of a broader Daubert motion challenging not only
the expert’s qualifications, but also the expert’s methodology.
In Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Industries, Inc., for example, the court excluded
portions of the testimony of plaintiff’s employee-expert on the issue of price
erosion damages based on a lack of expertise.136 The court found that plaintiff’s
expert lacked any background in economics and had no experience conducting
economic analyses. Moreover, he had no specific experience in pricing or
selling plumbing valves, the product at issue, let alone analyzing price erosion or
determining the effect of a higher price on product demand.137 As a result,
plaintiffs’ expert did not perform any economic studies to support his opinion
that plaintiff could have charged a higher price without any diminishing sales.
The court observed, however, that “in a credible economic analysis, the
patentee cannot show entitlement to a higher price divorced from the effect of
that higher price on demand for the product.” The court reasoned that “the
patentee must also present evidence of the (presumably reduced) amount of
product the patentee would have sold at the higher price.”138
A broad lack of qualifications may result in a broader exclusion. In InfoHold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, for example, the court concluded that an expert was
not qualified to offer a damages opinion at all where the expert had never
testified as a damages expert in a patent case before and had no prior
experience with patent damages calculations.139 Accordingly, the court excluded
the expert’s opinions in their entirety under Rule 702 and Daubert.
135 State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
136 Sloan Value Co. v. Zurn Inc., No. 16-w-60204, 2014 WL 806452 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2014).
137 Id. at *3–4.
138 Id. at *4 (quoting Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l., Inc., 246 F.3d 1336,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
139 Muzak LLC, 2013 WL 4482442, at *2.
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B. LIABILITY

As challenges to expert evidence in patent cases have become more
common, they have expanded into other areas. No longer is the focus solely on
expert damages testimony. Rather, parties are filing motions to exclude a
variety of expert opinions relating to liability, including opinions concerning
claim construction, infringement, validity and enablement, among other things.
These motions draw upon the general principles developed in other kinds of
cases and are becoming increasingly common.
1. The Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has only rarely addressed the
admissibility of expert opinions outside the damages context. In Pharmastem
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., for example, the Federal Circuit held that the
contributory infringement opinion of the patentee’s cell biology expert was not
helpful to the jury and not an appropriate subject for expert evidence in a case
involving alleged infringement of patents describing a process for collecting
newborn infants’ umbilical cord blood and preserving it through
cryopreservation.140 The court affirmed the district court, noting that the expert
simply quoted “promotional information and other materials in which the
defendants described their business operations for potential customers” and
drew certain “inferences from those materials.”141 The court concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the jury was capable
of understanding those materials without expert assistance.142
The court further observed that the expert conducted little analysis and what
analysis she did perform was flawed. Specifically, the court found that because
the expert’s testimony was “almost entirely based on an interpretation of
defendants’ marketing materials and materials directed to investors,” any
expertise the expert had as a cell biologist “was of no apparent help to the jury”
in interpreting such materials.143 Moreover, the court concluded that the
expert’s interpretation of these materials was “unreasonable” since they did not
represent that preserved cord blood samples contained a sufficient number of
stem cells to reconstitute an adult, as the expert maintained.144
2. The District Courts. While the Federal Circuit has not issued much in the
way of guidance concerning the application of Rule 702 to expert opinions
relating to liability issues, the district courts have frequently addressed such
questions. Drawing upon general principles governing the admissibility of

140
141
142
143
144

Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
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expert opinions under Rule 702, they have excluded or limited expert testimony
on a variety of different grounds.
a. Reliability and Scientific Support. District courts have excluded expert
opinions, for example, where they have found that the expert’s analysis was not
reliable or was unsupported. In Brandeis v. Keebler Co., for example, Judge
Posner, sitting again by designation, excluded certain opinions of experts
seeking to testify about liability issues in patent litigation over margarines used
in Keebler cookies that had positive effects on cholesterol. While the court did
not exclude the opinions of plaintiffs’ infringement and validity expert in their
entirety, it did exclude opinions regarding the positive health effects of the
patented margarine based on studies in monkeys. The court found that the
expert was “unable to evaluate the significance of studies on monkeys for
human consumption, other than to say that monkeys are genetically rather
similar to human beings.”145 As the court observed, “ ‘[i]n order for animal
studies to be admissible to prove causation in humans, there must be good
grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans.’ ”146
The court took a similarly targeted approach to Keebler’s expert. Keebler’s
expert critiqued the studies plaintiff relied on to support the health effects of
the patented margarine and concluded that the findings regarding beneficial
health effects could not be “generalized to all fat blends within the claimed
range, and therefore that the patent does not enable reproduction of the
patented product.”147 In support of her opinions, she cited certain other studies
indicating that some fat blends within the patent’s ranges did not produce the
claimed health effects. The court concluded that the expert could discuss those
studies and testify that they “cast doubt” on the validity of the study upon
which plaintiff’s expert relied, but could not testify that the studies “directly
contradict” plaintiff’s study “because of . . . differences in experimental
designs.”148
Finally, the court excluded opinions of another of Keebler’s experts based
on testing conducted in the expert’s home. Keebler’s expert opined that the fat
mixture that Keebler used was not really a margarine at all because it was not a
stable emulsion. In rejecting this opinion as based on an unreliable
methodology, the court concluded: “Conducting a test in one’s home of a
product that has been in transit for 36 hours strikes me as unprofessional; there
is no suggestion that it is an industry practice.”149
145 Brandeis Univ. v. Keebler Co., No. 1:12-cv-01508, 2013 WL 5911233, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
18, 2013).
146 Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994)).
147 Id.
148 Id. at *5.
149 Id.
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In XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the court similarly excluded certain
opinions by the defendant’s technical expert. The court concluded that the
expert could not offer the opinion that the source code he analyzed was
executed or implemented in prior art (specific demonstrations that were offered
before the critical date). The court found that the expert had failed to provide
“any reliable basis for drawing this inference based on his expertise.”150 The
expert indicated that in reaching this opinion, he had compared code text to
screen shots in user manuals and other documents, which the court found “falls
short of a reliable opinion based on [the expert’s] scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge, as required by Rule 702.”151 The court further found
that there was a danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 from such testimony
and that this ultimate conclusion was more properly left for the jury to decide.
In Magnetar Technologies Corp. and G&T Conveyer Co. v. Six Flags Theme Parks
Inc., a magistrate judge concluded that an expert’s infringement opinion relating
to patents for magnetic brakes “lack[ed] the proper grounds for his conclusions,
because it [was] void of the necessary analysis for comparing each element of
the claim to the accused product.”152 As the court observed, to establish
infringement, it was necessary to show that every limitation set forth in the
patent claim was in the accused product or process exactly or by substantial
equivalent. The court noted that the “ ‘patentee’s expert must set forth the
factual foundation for his infringement opinion in sufficient detail for the court
to be certain that features of the accused product would support a finding of
infringement under the claim construction adopted by the court. . . .’ ”153 The
expert’s opinion was inadmissible because it did not contain the required
analysis, but rather merely “conclusory statements,”154 citing the claim
limitations and providing only some general references to documents or
depositions without explaining “why the documents or deposition are relevant
to the technology involved” or the claims at issue.155 As the court observed,
quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Joiner, “ ‘nothing in either Daubert or
the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the

XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 09-157-RGA, 2013 WL 1702159, at *1 (D. Del.
Feb. 25, 2013).
151 Id.
152 Magnetar Technologies Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Parks Inc., No. 07-127-LPS-MPT, 2014
WL 529983, at *6 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014).
153 Id. (quoting Intellectual Sci. & Tech., Inc., 589 F.3d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
154 Id.
155 Id. at *8.
150
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expert.’ ”156 An expert cannot “provide[ ] data and a conclusion, with the
chasm between not bridged by any analysis.”157
Finally, an expert’s failure to eliminate alternative explanations for
observations supporting an infringement opinion can be a basis for exclusion.
In Furminator v. Kim Laube & Co., for example, the court excluded the opinions
of an accused infringer’s expert as unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert. The
expert offered the opinion that both the accused pet grooming tool and the
patented tool cut non-loose hair from furry pets. However, the court observed
that the expert’s opinion did not “properly account for the presence of cut or
fractured hairs that were caused by circumstances not related to the use of the
tools at issue in this case.”158 The expert therefore failed to effectively eliminate
potential alternative causes for the observations he made, rendering the expert’s
unreliable.159
b. General Acceptance and Scientific Support. Lack of support for an expert’s
methodology or acceptance within the scientific community may be a related
basis for exclusion of an expert’s opinions. In Carnegie Mellon University v.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., for example, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ scientific
expert, largely because his opinions were inconsistent with the views of the
scientific community.160 The court observed that, “[w]hile Daubert forbids the
exclusion of expert testimony on the basis of a rigid ‘general acceptance’ test, it
does not wholly remove this factor from consideration.”161 “A reliability
assessment . . . does permit[ ] explicit identification of a relevant scientific
community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance
within that community.”162 The court concluded that the expert’s opinion that
Taq DNA polymerase does not exhibit 3’–5’ exonuclease activity was inconsistent
with the view in the scientific community. As the court observed, a number of
treatises and articles published in peer-reviewed journals refuted this
contention.163 In addition, the court noted that “[l]ike the expert in Joiner,” the
expert had “analyzed data that was not his own and reinterpreted it in a manner
inconsistent with the conclusions of those who originally generated it.”164
In Trivitis, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., the court similarly excluded
testimony by an expert on mass spectronomy and HPLC analysis on the ground
Id. (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146).
Id. at *12.
158 Furminator v. Kim Laube & Co., 758 F. Supp. 2d 797, 808 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
159 Id.
160 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
161 Id. at 1032 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1031–32.
164 Id.
156
157
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that his methodology was unsupported. Instead of relying on ultraviolet
detection, the expert relied upon light scattering detection, which the court
characterized as “unconventional.”165 The expert failed to support his assertion
that this was an established, pre-litigation methodology that he had used before,
that light-scattering detection is an appropriate form of detection, and that the
testing was conducted in a scientifically acceptable manner. The court rejected
plaintiff’s argument that the fact that mass spectronomy and HPLC were
accepted methodologies was sufficient to carry plaintiff’s burden. Finally, the
court rejected affidavits plaintiff submitted in an attempt to validate the lightscattering methodology. The affidavits failed to set forth the qualifications of
the experts who purported to validate the methodology and did not sufficiently
establish that the methodology was reliable.166
c. Opinions Contrary to Claim Construction. The admissibility of expert
opinions relating to liability issues may overlap with substantive patent law
issues, just as it does in the context of expert damages testimony. For example,
courts have excluded expert opinions in certain circumstances where they were
contrary to the court’s claim construction or governing legal principles or where
the expert was seeking to offer what amounted to legal opinions.167 These
courts have followed guidance from the Federal Circuit and other courts, which
on occasion have noted “the impropriety of patent lawyers testifying as expert
witnesses and giving their opinion regarding the proper interpretation of a claim
as a matter of law, the ultimate issue for the court to decide.”168 Despite these
restrictions, experts are sometimes in appropriate circumstances permitted to
testify regarding how individuals with ordinary skill in the art understand claim
terms.
In MediaTek, Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., for example, the court
excluded certain opinions from plaintiff’s claim construction expert on the
ground that they relied largely on the prosecution of the patent at issue.169 The
court observed “ ‘[a]t trial, parties may “introduce[e] evidence as to the plain
and ordinary meaning of terms not construed by the Court to one skilled in the
art,” so long as the evidence does not amount to “argu[ing] claim construction to
165 Trivitis, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 101CV0316, 2012 WL 1944827, at *5
(S.D. Cal. May 29, 2012).
166 Id. at *6.
167 Hochstein v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-73071, 2009 WL 2022815, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 7,
2009) (excluding expert’s opinion to the extent it was inconsistent with special master’s construction
of claim as not including the requirement that data circuits be physically connected to the
communication medium).
168 Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
169 MediaTek, Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 2014 WL 971765, No. 11-cv-53414GR, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2015

25

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4

370

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 22:345

the jury.” ’ ”170 However, the court concluded that, “except in a rare case, use
of the prosecution history raises issues solely for the court, not the jury.”171
Thus testimony grounded in the prosecution history to discern
the meaning of a claim is properly excluded from presentation to
the jury, especially where, as here, a fair reading of the expert
report reveals an intention to argue claim construction. Similarly,
while the court may in its discretion, consider extrinsic evidence if
such sources will aid the court in determining “the true meaning
of language used in the patent claims,” such evidence, if required,
is not appropriate for presentation to a jury and is properly
excluded at trial.172
In Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., the court similarly
excluded opinions offered by defendant’s enablement expert, finding that his
opinions were based on an inaccurate legal standard.173 The court observed that
“the Federal Circuit has clearly and explicitly held that ‘[t]he dispositive question
of enablement does not turn on whether the accused product is enabled.’ ”174
Yet, defendant’s expert focused on use of the accused products as “the
touchstone for enablement.”175 The court therefore concluded that his
opinions were not sufficiently relevant and reliable to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 702 and Daubert.
In The Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc., the court excluded in part the opinions of
plaintiff’s expert regarding the defendant’s drug compounding process.176 The
court had ruled at the summary judgment stage that the compounding process
the defendant used was not directly relevant to infringement because the
asserted claims in the patent-in-suit did not contain process limitations.177 The
process was only “indirectly relevant” to infringement insofar as it might affect
whether Mylan’s bivalirudin drug product would infringe the maximum
impurities limitation of the asserted claims.178 Accordingly, the court held that
the expert could not opine regarding whether Mylan’s compounding process
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
172 Id.
173 Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-0068-JRG-RSP, 2013
WL 5962812 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2013).
174 Id. at *2 (quoting Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
175 Id.
176 The Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc., No. 11-cv-1285, 2014 WL 1929360, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May
15, 2014).
177 Id. at *1.
178 Id. at *5.
170
171
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was “efficient,” but could testify as to how it would affect the characteristics of
the bivalirudin drug product it generated.179
In EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Systems, Inc., the court excluded the testimony of
plaintiff’s technical expert where the expert acknowledged that he was “not
qualified to provide expert testimony on the operations of the PTO or how to
construe claims.”180 Moreover, the court noted that “it is the Court’s duty to
instruct the jury on the applicable principles of patent law, just as claim
construction is an issue for the Court and not the jury.”181 Accordingly, the
court held that these were not proper subjects for expert testimony.182
Finally, in Astrazeneca UK Ltd. v. Watson Labs., Inc., the court excluded the
testimony of a legal expert who planned to testify that an experienced chemical
patent practitioner would read neither the patent’s claims nor prosecution
history as affirmatively limiting the patent’s description of the invention and the
scope of the salts that were equivalent.183 The court found that the expert was
not a person of ordinary skill in the art of the patent-in-suit and was offering
what amounted to impermissible legal opinions.184
d. Parties’ Intent. Experts seeking to testify about a party’s intent when
taking certain actions before the Patent Office may find themselves subject to a
Daubert challenge seeking to limit or exclude their opinions.185 In The Medicines
Co. v. Mylan Inc., for example, the court excluded the defense expert’s opinions
regarding the state of mind of the inventors and their intent to deceive the
Patent Office regarding the applications and examination of the patent-in-suit.
The court concluded that “[p]atent experts may not testify that they know the
patentee’s intent to hide or lie about certain information during the patent
prosecution process ‘because they are not mind readers.’ ”186 Likewise, “patent
experts may not ‘plumb the inventor’s and attorney’s minds and discern
whether they ‘lacked candor’ or had actual intent to deceive during the patent
prosecution process.’ ”187 Accordingly the court excluded any expert testimony
regarding the parties’ intent, while indicating that the expert could identify facts
from the file history and record to support an inference that the applicant acted
Id.
EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Systems, Inc., No. CIV. 98-7364, 2003 WL 1610781, at *7 (D.
Minn. Mar. 8, 2003).
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Astrazeneca UK Ltd. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 2012 WL 5900686, at *1–2 (D. Del. Nov. 14,
2012).
184 Id. at *2.
185 2014 WL 1758135, at *5.
186 Id. (quoting Bone Care Int’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., No. 08-CV-1083, 2010 WL 3894444,
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2010)).
187 Id.
179
180
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with intent to deceive.188 Similarly, the court excluded expert opinions
regarding what the Patent Office examiner would have done if given different
information as speculation.189 Nonetheless, the court indicated that it would
allow testimony as to what the expert believed would have been material to the
patent examiner.190
e. Expert Qualifications. Finally, a lack of qualifications may also
undermine an expert’s opinions. In TASER International, Inc. v. Karbon Arms,
LLC, for example, the court excluded the opinion of an expert who admittedly
had no expertise in electrophysiology.191 While defendants argued that the
expert’s testimony concerned only electrical engineering and not
electrophysiology specifically, the court concluded that there were “numerous
instances” where the expert offered opinions in the area of electrophysiology in
rebutting the opinions of plaintiff’s expert.192 The court therefore excluded
these opinions as outside the expert’s area of expertise.193
Similarly, in Trivitis, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., the court excluded the
testimony of the patent holder and CEO of the plaintiff company who sought
to testify as an expert on HPLC and mass spectronomy.194 The court noted
that, while the patent holder had a degree in mathematics, he did not have a
degree in chemistry and testified that his only formal chemistry education was a
high school chemistry class and college chemistry courses.195 Moreover, the
expert offered only “conclusory” assertions that he had experience and training
in HPLC and mass spectrometry. Accordingly, the court concluded that
plaintiff failed to meet the threshold showing that the expert was qualified to
present testimony on HPLC or mass spectronomy.196
IV. CONCLUSION
These examples demonstrate the increasing frequency with which parties are
filing motions seeking the exclusion of expert opinions under Rule 702 and
Daubert in patent cases as well as the diversity of circumstances in which such
challenges arise. Scrutiny of expert damages opinions under Rule 702 is
Id.
Id. at *7.
190 Id.
191 Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Karbon Arms, LLC, No. 11-426-R0A, 2013 WL 6705478 (D. Del. Dec.
18, 2013).
192 Id. at *1.
193 Id.
194 Teivitis, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 10CV0316, 2012 WL 1944827, at *6
(S.D. Cal. May 29, 2012).
195 Id. at *4.
196 Id.
188
189
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frequently undertaken pursuant to a well-established framework developed by
the Federal Circuit. However, challenges to expert opinions involving liabilityrelated issues are increasingly common. Here, too, courts may draw upon a
well-established body of legal principles falling outside the patent context, but
nonetheless readily lending themselves to application in review of expert
opinions offered in patent cases.
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